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Abstract— We study the complexity of rationalizing network
formation. In this problem we fix an underlying model describing
how selfish parties (the vertices) produce a graph by making
individual decisions to form or not form incident edges. The model
is equipped with a notion of stability (or equilibrium), and we
observe a set of “snapshots” of graphs that are assumed to be
stable. From this we would like to infer some unobserved data
about the system: edge prices, or how much each vertex values
short paths to each other vertex.
We study two rationalization problems arising from the network
formation model of Jackson and Wolinsky [14]. When the goal is
to infer edge prices, we observe that the rationalization problem
is easy. The problem remains easy even when rationalizing prices
do not exist and we instead wish to find prices that maximize the
stability of the system.
In contrast, when the edge prices are given and the goal is
instead to infer valuations of each vertex by each other vertex,
we prove that the rationalization problem becomes NP-hard. Our
proof exposes a close connection between rationalization problems
and the Inequality-SAT (I-SAT) problem.
Finally and most significantly, we prove that an approximation
version of this NP-complete rationalization problem is NP-hard to
approximate to within better than a 1/2 ratio. This shows that the
trivial algorithm of setting everyone’s valuations to infinity (which
rationalizes all the edges present in the input graphs) or to zero
(which rationalizes all the non-edges present in the input graphs)
is the best possible assuming P = NP. To do this we prove a tight
(1/2+ δ)-approximation hardness for a variant of I-SAT in which
all coefficients are non-negative. This in turn follows from a tight
hardness result for MAX-LINR+ (linear equations over the reals,
with non-negative coefficients), which we prove by a (non-trivial)
modification of the recent result of Guruswami and Raghavendra
[10] which achieved tight hardness for this problem without the
non-negativity constraint.
Our technical contributions regarding the hardness of I-SAT and
MAX-LINR+ may be of independent interest, given the generality
of these problems.
Keywords-network formation games, rationalization, Jackson-
Wolinsky model, Inequality-SAT, hardness of approximation
1. INTRODUCTION
In any market setting where different goods are avail-
able at different prices, consumers demonstrate a revealed
preference for a particular bundle by choosing to buy it.
They do so in spite of the existence of other bundles of
Supported by NSF CCF-0346991, CCF-0830787, BSF 2004329, and a
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goods that may be more affordable. Revealed preference
theory in economics is a well-studied area [17], [1], [4], [19]
that uses these observed choices to infer preference profiles,
and, more subtly, to argue about the limitations of such
inferences by identifying settings in which simple classes of
preference profiles (e.g. linear utility functions) can always
rationalize data satisfying basic axioms — the conclusion
being that experiments of this sort cannot be expected to
provide evidence that a more complicated (e.g. non-linear)
preference profile is actually in use.
From a computer science perspective, a natural question
is: how hard is it, computationally, to infer unobserved
quantities (e.g. preferences profiles, utility functions, prices)
that explain or rationalize the observed market data? Such
problems abound in systems where there is an underlying
notion of stability or equilibrium (and one assumes that the
observed data represent stable instances).
In certain classical settings [1], rationalization amounts to
solving a linear program, and so it is immediately seen to be
easy. Other settings have a more combinatorial feel, such as
rationalizing matchings, which we studied in previous work
[15]. In this problem the input is a collection of bipartite
matchings, each meant to represent the observed outcome of
a two-sided market. We showed in [15] that determining the
existence of preference orders under which the matchings
are all stable matchings is NP-complete, and NP-hard to
approximate to within a constant factor.
In this work, we consider the rationalization problem
for network formation games. We study two variants of a
prominent model due to Jackson and Wolinsky [14] that
describes how selfish parties (the vertices) produce a graph
by making individual decisions to form or not form incident
edges. The model is equipped with a notion of stability
(or equilibrium), and we observe a set of “snapshots” of
graphs that are assumed to be stable. From this we would
like to infer some unobserved data about the system: in one
variant we are interested in edge prices; in the other, we
are interested in how much each vertex values short paths
to each other vertex. Both variants resemble the settings in
which the rationalization problem can be solved using linear
programming (in the sense that the equilibrium conditions
can be expressed as linear inequalities), and yet they have
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a combinatorial component because the participants’ total
utility depends on the length of various shortest paths in the
network.
In this paper we show an interesting contrast: inferring
“per-edge” quantities (i.e., prices) is easy, while inferring
“end-to-end” quantities (i.e., the value each vertex u assigns
to having a short path to each other vertex v) is hard. In
the latter case we show a tight (1/2 + δ) inapproximability
result (and this is our most technically significant contribu-
tion). The 1/2 ratio implies that the trivial approximation
algorithm that sets everyone’s valuations to infinity (which
rationalizes all the edges present in the input graphs) or
to zero (which rationalizes all the non-edges present in the
input graphs) is the best possible assuming P = NP.
1.1. The network formation model and two rationalization
problems
The network formation model we study is one proposed
by Jackson and Wolinsky [14]. In this model, there are
n vertices, and each pair (u, v) (“potential edge”) has an
associated price and a distance. A network formation process
produces a graph G, and given this outcome, the utility that
accrues to each vertex v depends on two additional features
of the model: (1) a non-increasing function f from distances
to the non-negative reals (think of f(d) as representing the
value of having a connection of length d), and (2) “intrinsic
values” of vertex u by v for each u = v. The utility realized
by vertex v is then the aggregate distance minus the price
of the edges in v’s subset, where the aggregate distance is
the sum over vertices u of v’s intrinsic value of u times f
applied to the shortest path length in G to each u.
The equilibrium concept here is not a Nash equilibrium1,
but rather a simpler notion of pairwise stability; the vertex
strategies are stable if (1) for each edge (u, v) in G, both
v’s and u’s marginal utility of forming edge (u, v) is non-
negative, and (2) for each non-edge (u, v) in G either u’s or
v’s marginal utility of forming edge (u, v) is non-positive.
We consider two rationalization problems arising under
this model. In the first, which we call STABLE-PRICES, we
are trying to infer edge prices, and we assume the other
data (distances, the function f , and the pairwise “intrinsic
values”) are fixed or given. Specifically, we are given a
collection of distance-weighted graphs G1, G2, . . . , Gm on
the same underlying vertex set, that arise from equilibrium
play. In addition, we are given the function f (as a circuit
computing it), and the pairwise intrinsic values (which are
the same across the different graphs). We do not observe
the (potential) edge prices (which are the same across the
different graphs). We are interested in determining edge
prices that rationalize G1, G2, . . . , Gm; i.e., for which each
Gi is stable, or “in equilibrium,” in the above sense.
1This is because we only consider unilateral deviations of a player to an
adjacent strategy – one in which a single edge has been added or removed
– instead of to any alternative strategy.
In the second rationalization problem under consideration,
which we call STABLE-VALUES, we are trying to infer the
pairwise “intrinsic values,” and we assume the other data
(latencies, the function f , and the edge prices) are given.
Specifically, as above, we are given a collection of distance-
weighted graphs G1, G2, . . . , Gm on the same underlying
vertex set, that arise from equilibrium play. In addition, we
are given the function f (as a circuit2), and the edge prices
(which are the same across the different graphs); we do not
observe the pairwise “intrinsic values” (which are the same
across the different graphs). We are interested in determining
pairwise intrinsic values that rationalize G1, G2, . . . , Gm;
i.e., for which each Gi is stable, or “in equilibrium”, in the
above sense.
We also consider an optimization version of STABLE-
VALUES. In it, we are seeking pairwise “intrinsic values”
that maximize the number of stable edges/non-edges across
all m input graphs among active pairs. We deem a pair
(u, v) active unless (1) it is an edge in all of the input
graphs, with price zero (which means effectively that edge
(u, v) is present and fixed no matter how the other quantities
are varied) or (2) it is a non-edge in all of the input
graphs, with price infinity (which means effectively that edge
(u, v) is permanently absent regardless of the other relevant
quantities). Non-active pairs are “part of the landscape” and
intuitively do not contribute to the stability of the system.
After this consideration, our optimization problem is to infer
intrinsic values with the maximum explanatory power (and
note that edges/non-edges are counted separately for each
graph in which they appear).
For concreteness, we briefly describe an example scenario
in which this rationalization problem naturally arises. Social
networks are formed among groups of people who ascribe
a certain value (“friendship”) to one another but establish
connections with only those that they perceive to be most
intrinsically valuable to them. If, for instance, everybody in
the group was in close physical proximity to one another
(they all went to the same high school or college) then
the price of connecting to any one person is insignificant
compared to the value derived in return, no matter how
small that may be. This would result in a clique as a stable
network. However, once this group becomes geographically
spread out, the network formed in equilibrium can become
sparser, such as a star network, where all connections are
made to a single person since the cost of building mutual
connections outweighs the utility gained. This illustrates that
(when holding the intrinsic value people in such a group
have for one another to be invariant) temporal and spatial
dynamics affect the manner of how social networks coalesce
and stabilize. While prices and distances might be readily
observable, the intrinsic value each individual has for each
2This permits unnatural functions f , but note that all of our reductions
produce instances with very simple piecewise linear and non-increasing f
that one can easily envision occurring in the real world.
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other individual is generally private. The problem STABLE-
VALUES in this paper asks to infer these values given (say) a
series of snapshots taken over time of a single social network
of individuals.
1.2. Rationalization problems and I-SAT
As mentioned above, we show that STABLE-PRICES is
easy, while STABLE-VALUES is hard. Our hardness result
is based on a reduction from a variant of the Inequality
Satisfiability problem (abbreviated as I-SAT) introduced re-
cently by Hochbaum and Moreno-Centeno [12]. An instance
of I-SAT is a conjunction of inequality-clauses, where each
inequality-clause is a disjunction of linear inequalities over
n real variables x1, x2, . . . , xn. The instance is a “yes”
instance iff there exists an assignment of real values to
the variables simultaneously satisfying all of the inequality-
clauses. Hochbaum and Moreno-Centeno showed by a sim-
ple reduction from 3-SAT that this class of problems is NP-
complete even in the case when each inequality-clause is a
disjunction of only two inequalities.
The variant of I-SAT that we need for our reduction
satisfies two additional constraints: (1) all of the coefficients
are non-negative (and we are seeking a solution only in
the non-negative reals), and (2) there is a partition of the
variables into two sets S, T such that every inequality-clause
is either the disjunction of two ≤ inequalities, one supported
in S and one supported in T , or a conjunction of two ≥
inequalities, one supported in S and one in T . We call this
variant I-SAT∗.
To achieve our main hardness results, we show that I-SAT∗
is NP-complete, and that the optimization version (maximize
the number of inequality-clauses simultaneously satisfied)
is NP-hard to approximate to within (1/2 + δ). Note that,
just as it is trivial to achieve approximation ratio 1/2 in the
rationalization problem to which we reduce, it is trivial to
achieve approximation ratio 1/2 here by either setting all
variables to zero (satisfying all the inequality-clauses of the
first type) or setting all variables sufficiently large (satisfying
all the inequality-clauses of the second type).
The ease of translating between these problems brings
us to an important observation. Not only is I-SAT useful
as a starting point for reductions involving the hard ratio-
nalization problem in this paper, but we contend it is the
abstract computational problem that captures rationalization
problems more generally. It is common for the “stability con-
ditions” arising in a rationalization problem to be expressible
by a finite Boolean formula whose inputs are inequalities in
the (real) quantities being inferred. This is true, e.g., for the
bipartite matchings problem studied in [15] (the quantities
being inferred are the values each left node has for each right
node, and the familiar stability condition for stable match-
ings is expressible as the disjunction of two inequalities
involving these quantities), for the rationalization problems
studied here, and those mentioned in the introduction. Even
the positivity constraint we add arises naturally in many such
settings, as utilities, prices, etc. are often assumed to be non-
negative.
Thus we expect that a more complete understanding
of the approximability of I-SAT (which to our knowledge
has not been studied prior to this paper) can serve as a
useful starting point for understanding the approximability
of rationalization problems more generally, and we view this
as an important contribution of this paper.
1.3. Hardness of approximating I-SAT∗ via MAX-LINR+
For the general I-SAT problem, there is an easy reduction
from MAX-LINR (linear equations over the reals). Namely,
for each equation
∑
i aixi = b, we produce the pair of I-SAT
clauses
∑
i aixi ≤ b and
∑
i aixi ≥ b.
MAX-LINR was (only recently) shown to have a PCP
system with (1 − ) completeness and γ soundness [10]
(with , γ close to 0), which gives rise to (1/2 + δ)-
inapproximability for the general I-SAT problem via this
reduction (although, the non-perfect completeness means
this gap is between classes of unsatisfiable instances, which
is a minor drawback).
We need a similar hardness result for our variant, I-SAT∗,
which crucially entails a positivity constraint. In the [10] in-
approximability result (and similar inapproximability results
using the basic framework of Hastad [11]), the equations
all have the form xi + xj − xk = 0 since they arise from
linearity tests performed by the verifier in the PCP system.
Thus, they are not suitable for proving inapproximability for
I-SAT∗. Simple transformations like translating the origin do
not work, and the natural idea of introducing new variables
x′i and the constraints xi +x′i = 0 (and using x′i in place of
−xi to remove the negative coefficients) does not preserve
the inapproximability.
It is also important to note that while Hastad’s inapprox-
imability results for MAX-LINFp can be easily transformed
into similar inapproximability results for MAX-LINZ, this
transformation introduces large coefficients (of magnitude
p), which prohibit the clever trick in [10] that is used to
argue that the inapproximability carries over to the reals.
So our hands are somewhat tied: to obtain the (1/2 + δ)
inapproximability for I-SAT∗, we really need an exact analog
of [10], but one that produces equations with positive coeffi-
cients. In Section 5, we give such a result for MAX-LINR+ ,
showing that it is NP-hard to distinguish between an instance
with a (1 − ) fraction satisfiable assignment and one with
at most δ fraction satisfiable, and in turn a (1/2 + δ)
inapproximability result for I-SAT∗. Doing so requires more
than a superficial modification of the proof in [10]. In
stating our results, we abstract properties of the distribution
used for the verifier’s queries that are sufficient for the
general proof strategy of [10] to work, and then utilize
a different distribution (and some minor changes in the
Fourier analysis) to eventually produce equations with all
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coefficients +1. This result is our most significant technical
contribution.
1.4. Related work
Rationalizability has been well-studied under the domain
of revealed preference theory and social choice theory by
economists [17], [19], [18], [9], [3], [20], [7]. Traditionally,
the questions have been connected with characterizing the
implications of various solution concepts to games and
market settings, and whether these implications can be tested
based on data obtained from consumer choices.
In connection with studying network formation games,
while the question of understanding the properties and
limitations of equilibria is not new [14], [6], [13], [5], [8],
to the best of our knowledge there is no previous work done
with respect to either the rationalizability question for these
games in general, or the Jackson-Wolinsky model of network
formation in particular.
1.5. Outline
In Section 3 we formally define STABLE-PRICES, and
observe that it is easy (and even the optimization variant
is easy to solve exactly). In Section 4 we define STABLE-
VALUES and give a reduction from I-SAT∗ to it. We then
show that I-SAT∗ is NP-complete (this is not subsumed by
our eventual inapproximability result, since this reduction
has perfect completeness). In Section 5 we state an approx-
imation preserving reduction from MAX-LINR+ to I-SAT∗,
and we then describe the PCP system (based on a non-trivial
modification of [10]) that implies  inapproximability for it.
This yields the tight (1/2+δ) inapproximability for STABLE-
VALUES.
2. JACKSON-WOLINSKY MODEL FOR NETWORK
FORMATION GAMES
We describe formally the seminal model for stability of
network formation games as formulated by Jackson and
Wolinsky [14]. The model comprises:
• n agents V
• pairwise distance function d : V × V → R+
• pairwise intrinsic value function w : V × V → R+
• a function f : R+ → R that defines the contribution of
a path of length d
• price profile c : V × V → R+
For a graph G and any two i, j ∈ V , we define dG(i, j) to
be the distance of the shortest path P (i, j) from i to j given
by
∑
(u,v)∈P (i,j) d(u, v). Let Γ(v) be the set of neighbors
of v. The utility agent i derives in graph G, denoted ui(G),
is given by:
ui(G) =
∑
j∈V
f(dG(i, j))w(i, j)−
∑
k∈Γ(i)
c(i, k)
Definition 2.1: A graph G = (V,E) is said to be pairwise
stable with respect to d, w, f, c if:
1) for all i, j ∈ V such that (i, j) ∈ G,
ui(G) ≥ ui(G− (i, j)) and uj(G) ≥ uj(G− (i, j))
2) for all i, j ∈ V such that (i, j) /∈ G,
ui(G) ≥ ui(G + (i, j)) or uj(G) ≥ uj(G + (i, j))
In this definition both endpoints must prefer that an edge
in G exists (or at least be indifferent to its existence) for
the edge to be stable; correspondingly a non-edge in G is
stable if even one endpoint prefers that is not be present (or
at least is indifferent to its presence).
3. FINDING STABLE PRICES WHEN INTRINSIC VALUES
ARE KNOWN
In the first rationalization problem that we will call
STABLE-PRICES, we consider a scenario where the intrinsic
values are known but the edge-prices are not. We are given
a collection of undirected graphs G1, . . . , Gm all of which
are formed over a common set of vertices V . In addition,
we are given the pairwise distance functions for each Gi,
di : V × V → R+. The rationalizability question entails
inferring the prices that players in each of the graphs would
have to pay given that the graphs are in pairwise equilibrium.
Problem 1. STABLE-PRICES
Given: Collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm over common set
of vertices V
Pairwise distance functions di : V × V → R+ for
i = 1, . . . , m
Intrinsic value function w : V × V → R+
Path distance contribution function f : R+ → R,
where f is non-increasing.
Find: Price profile c that rationalizes G1, . . . , Gm, i.e. for
which Gi is stable w.r.t. di, w, f, c for all i, if it exists.
In the above problem (and in the subsequent version,
STABLE-VALUES) we assume that f is given to us in the
form of a circuit that takes as input numbers represented
with some number of bits of precision that is polynomial in
the size of the rest of the input. This precision is sufficient
to exactly express the shortest path distance to which f is
applied.
Theorem 3.1: There is a polynomial-time algorithm for
STABLE-PRICES.
Proof: The algorithm is based on the simple intuition
that for an edge to exist between two vertices v, w it must be
the case that the marginal utility that v derives by building
that edge must be at least 0 and the same for u, while for a
non-edge (v, w), either v or w must have a marginal utility
at most 0. These marginal utilities are easy to compute, and
they yield a system of linear inequalities exactly describing
stable edge prices. For details, please refer to a full version
of this paper.
We think of a price profile c as rationalizing (u, v) in
Gi if the conditions in Definition 2.1 hold for (u, v). An
488
Authorized licensed use limited to: CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on June 25,2010 at 22:25:06 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
optimization version of the STABLE-PRICES problem is,
given a collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm, to find a price
profile that rationalizes the maximum number of “(u, v) in
Gi” pairs. It is easy to see that the same algorithm described
above will also work to find a price profile that would solve
the optimization problem for STABLE-PRICES exactly.
Corollary 3.2: Given an instance of STABLE-PRICES
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to construct a price
profile c that rationalizes the maximum number of “(u, v)
in Gi” pairs.
4. FINDING STABLE INTRINSIC VALUES WHEN PRICES
ARE KNOWN
In the problem of STABLE-VALUES, we consider the
scenario where the edge-prices are known but the intrinsic
values function w is unknown. We define STABLE-VALUES
below and show that STABLE-VALUES is NP-hard by a
reduction from a special variant of I-SAT (defined below).
Problem 2. STABLE-VALUES
Given: Collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm over common set of
vertices V
Pairwise distance functions di : V × V → R+ for
i = 1, . . . , m
Path distance contribution function f : R+ → R where
f is non-increasing
Price profile c : V × V → R+
Find: Intrinsic values function w : V × V → R+ that
rationalizes G1, . . . , Gm, i.e. for which Gi
is pairwise stable w.r.t. di, w, f, c for all i, if it exists.
Problem 3. I-SAT∗
Given: n variables x1, . . . , xn, and a partition S ∪ T of [n].
m clauses that are either of type 1:(∑
i∈S aixi ≤ 1
)
OR
(∑
j∈T cjxj ≤ 1
)
or of type 2:(∑
i∈S aixi ≥ 1
)
AND
(∑
j∈T cjxj ≥ 1
)
,
where all ai, cj ≥ 0.
Find: An assignment for x1, . . . , xn ∈ R+ satisfying all m
clauses, if it exists.
Theorem 4.1: I-SAT∗ is NP-complete.
Proof: We give a reduction from 3-SAT. Consider an
instance of 3-SAT given by n variables x1, . . . , xn and m
clauses C1, . . . , Cm. For each variable xi our instance of
I-SAT∗ has two variables zti , z
f
i and for each clause Cj , we
have three auxiliary variables aj, bj , cj . In total, we will have
2n+3m unknowns in our I-SAT∗ instance and we partition
this into S = {zti , zfi |i = 1, . . . , n} and T = {aj , bj, cj |j =
1, . . . ,m}.
For each clause Cj , we produce three I-SAT∗ clauses of
type 1 and one of type 2. Suppose Cj = (xp + x¯q + xr) by
way of example. Our reduction produces the type 2 clause:(
zti
3
+
zfi
3
≥ 1
)
AND
(
aj
4
+
bj
4
+
cj
4
≥ 1
)
(1)
and the following three type 1 clauses(
ztp ≤ 1
)
OR (aj ≤ 1)
(zfq ≤ 1) OR (bj ≤ 1)(
ztr ≤ 1
)
OR (cj ≤ 1)
Suppose that there exists a satisfiable assignment for the
3-SAT instance. Then, for each xi that is true in this
assignment we let zti = 1, z
f
i = 2 and for each xi that
is false, we let zti = 2, z
f
i = 1. For each clause Cj , set
one of the aj , bj, cj variables to 2 that corresponds to a true
literal, and the others to 1. These assignments satisfy all four
I-SAT∗ clauses corresponding to clause Cj .
In the other direction, we claim that setting xi to be
true for exactly those i such that zti ≤ 1 is a satisfying
assignment. For each clause Cj , it cannot be the case that
aj , bj, cj are all ≤ 1, as this would violate the associated
type 2 I-SAT∗ clause. Thus at least one of the variable
appearing positively in Cj must have zti ≤ 1 or one of the
variables appearing negatively must have zfi ≤ 1. Moreover,
the type 2 I-SAT∗ clause ensures that it can’t be the case
that zti and z
f
i are both ≤ 1, so as claimed, the derived
assignment is consistent, and it is a satisfying assignment
since it makes at least one literal in each clause true.
The following reduction is actually approximation pre-
serving, a fact that we will use in Section 5.
Theorem 4.2: STABLE-VALUES is NP-complete.
Proof: Our proof is by reduction from I-SAT∗.
Suppose we are given an instance of I-SAT∗ with m
clauses C1, . . . , Cm over n unknowns x1, . . . , xn where
each clause Ci is of type 1:(∑
i∈S
aixi ≤ 1
)
OR
⎛
⎝∑
j∈T
cjxj ≤ 1
⎞
⎠
or of type 2(∑
i∈S
aixi ≥ 1
)
AND
⎛
⎝∑
j∈T
cjxj ≥ 1
⎞
⎠
and all ai, cj ≥ 0 and S ∪ T is a partition of [n]. Fix
L to be the least integer that is greater than all of the
ai, cj coefficients appearing in these clauses. Our reduction
produces m edge-weighted graphs G1, . . . , Gm on (n + 3)
vertices labeled v1, . . . , vn, u, s, t as follows.
For each clause C (of either type), we construct a base
graph G. For each i ∈ S, G contains edge (s, vi) with weight
d(s, vi) = L + ai and edge (t, vi) with weight d(t, vi) =
L. Similarly for each j ∈ T , G contains edge (s, vj) with
weight d(s, vj) = L, and edge (t, vj) with weight d(t, vj) =
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L + cj . We also include edges (s, u), (u, t) with weights
d(s, u) = d(t, u) = L/2.
If C is of type 1, the base graph is the graph associated
with C; refer to Figure 1. If C is of type 2, we add the
edge (s, t) with weight d(s, t) = 0 to the base graph; refer
to Figure 2.
We set the cost of an edge from s to t to be c(s, t) = 1.
Note that with the exception of the edge (s, t), all of our
graphs contain exactly the same set of edges. For any pair of
vertices (p, q) other than (s, t), we set c(p, q) = 0 if (p, q)
is an edge and c(p, q) = ∞ if (p, q) is a non-edge.
Finally, we define the piecewise-linear function f as
follows:
f(x) =
{
−L 0 ≤ x ≤ L
−x x > L
 
 
 
 
 
vj vi
s t
u
L L
T S
L/
2 L/2
L
+
a
i
L
+
c j
Figure 1. G from clause of type 1, with edge weights
 
 
 
 
 
vj vi
s t
u
0
L L
T S
L/
2 L/2
L
+
a
i
L
+
c j
Figure 2. G from clause of type 2, with edge weights
This completes the description of the reduction. We now
show that the stability conditions for each graph are exactly
the conjunction or disjunction of linear inequalities of the
associated I-SAT∗ clause.
Fix a graph G associated with I-SAT∗ clause C. We first
note that all stability conditions not involving edge (s, t) are
trivially satisfied. This is because for any other pair (p, q),
the cost is 0 if (p, q) is an edge in G (so both p and q are
indifferent to keeping it, which makes it stable), and the cost
is ∞ if (p, q) is a non-edge in G (so neither p nor q benefit
from adding it, making it stable).
Now we focus on the stability conditions for (s, t), which
are
us(G + (s, t)) ≤ us(G) OR ut(G + (s, t)) ≤ ut(G)
if (s, t) is a non-edge in G and
us(G− (s, t)) ≥ us(G) AND ut(G− (s, t)) ≥ ut(G)
if (s, t) is an edge in G. The following notation will be
helpful. For a graph G, edge e and pair of vertices u, v, we
define
Δf+e(u, v) = f(dG+e(u, v))− f(dG(u, v))
which can be thought of as the “value added” (for vertices
u and v) by adding edge e to the graph G. Similarly we
define
Δf−e(u, v) = f(dG(u, v))− f(dG−e(u, v))
which can be thought of as the “value added” (for vertices u
and v) by deleting edge e from the graph G. After expanding
and rearranging terms, the pairwise stability conditions for
(s, t) then become:∑
v Δf+(s,t)(s, v) · w(s, v) ≤ c(s, t)
OR∑
v Δf+(s,t)(t, v) · w(t, v) ≤ c(s, t)
if (s, t) is a non-edge in G and∑
v Δf−(s,t)(s, v) · w(s, v) ≥ c(s, t)
AND∑
v Δf−(s,t)(t, v) · w(t, v) ≥ c(s, t)
if (s, t) is an edge in G.
Table I
SHORTEST PATH DISTANCE FOR G CONSTRUCTED FROM A TYPE 1
CLAUSE
(p, q) dG(p, q) dG+(s,t)(p, q) Δf+(s,t)(p, q)
(s, vi) i ∈ S L+ ai L ai
(t, vi) i ∈ S L L 0
(s, vj) j ∈ T L L 0
(t, vj) j ∈ T L + cj L cj
(s, t) L 0 0
(s, u), (t, u) L/2 L/2 0
If (s, t) is a non-edge in G (so G was constructed from a
type 1 clause C), then Table I calculates the coefficients of
w(s, ·), and w(t, ·) in the above inequalities; if (s, t) is an
edge in G (so G was constructed from a type 2 clause C)
then Table II calculates the coefficients. Plugging these in,
and using the fact that c(s, t) = 1, we get exactly∑
i∈S ai · w(s, vi) ≤ 1
OR∑
j∈T ci · w(t, vj) ≤ 1
490
Authorized licensed use limited to: CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on June 25,2010 at 22:25:06 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Table II
SHORTEST PATH DISTANCE FOR G CONSTRUCTED FROM A TYPE 2
CLAUSE
(p, q) dG−(s,t)(p, q) dG(p, q) Δf−(s,t)(p, q)
(s, vi) i ∈ S L + ai L ai
(t, vi) i ∈ S L L 0
(s, vj) j ∈ T L L 0
(t, vj) j ∈ T L + cj L cj
(s, t) L 0 0
(s, u), (t, u) L/2 L/2 0
in the case that G was constructed from type 1 clause Ci,
and ∑
i∈S ai · w(s, vi) ≥ 1
AND∑
j∈T ci · w(t, vj) ≥ 1
in the case that G was constructed from type 2 clause Ci.
Thus in both cases the stability conditions arising in
graph G constructed from I-SAT∗ clause C are exactly the
constraints given by the clause, with the intrinsic values
w(s, vi) playing the role of the variables xi for i ∈ S, and
the intrinsic values w(s, vj) playing the role of the variables
xj for j ∈ T .
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
We now get to the meat of the paper, where we give a
tight inapproximability result for an optimization version of
STABLE-VALUES.
5. A TIGHT INAPPROXIMABILITY RESULT FOR
STABLE-VALUES
Before defining the optimization version of STABLE-
VALUES, we need to define the notion of active pairs:
Definition 5.1: Given an instance of STABLE-VALUES
containing a collection of graphs G1, . . . , Gm all over a set
of vertices V and a price profile c : V × V → R+, a pair
(u, v) ∈ V × V is said to be an active pair if it is not the
case that i) (u, v) ∈ Gi for all i AND c(u, v) = 0, or ii)
(u, v) /∈ Gi for any i AND c(u, v) = ∞.
As explained in the introduction, a pair (u, v) that is not
an active pair effectively “comes for free” since regardless
of what the intrinsic values for u, v are, the pairwise stability
conditions are trivially satisfied because c(u, v) = 0 if
(u, v) ∈ Gi for all i and c(u, v) = ∞ if (u, v) /∈ Gi for
any i.
As before, we think of an intrinsic values function w
as rationalizing an active pair (u, v) in Gi if the stability
conditions in Definition 2.1 hold for (u, v). Then, the MAX-
STABLE-VALUES problem is to seek intrinsic values that
rationalize the maximum number of active pairs (u, v),
counted separately for each Gi. We observed in the in-
troduction that there is a trivial 1/2-factor approximation
algorithm. More precisely, for each non-edge, either adding
it does not change the aggregate distance contributions for
either of its endpoints (in which case it is stable regardless
of the intrinsic valuations), or else it is rationalized when the
intrinsic valuations are all set to 0; similarly for each edge,
either removing it does not change the aggregate distance
contributions for its endpoints (in which case it is stable iff
its cost is 0, regardless of the intrinsic valuations), or else
it is rationalized when the intrinsic valuations are all set
to ∞. Thus one of the two extremes (setting all intrinsic
valuations to 0, or all intrinsic valuations to ∞) rationalizes
at least 1/2 of the “(u, v) in Gi” pairs that are rationalized
by an optimum solution. We prove in this section that this
1/2 factor is tight assuming P = NP .
To our end of showing a hardness result for MAX-
STABLE-VALUES we show an inapproximability result for
MAX-LINZ+ , which is the main technical contribution of this
paper. Although MAX-STABLE-VALUES is actually defined
over the reals and would admittedly require us to show a
hardness result for MAX-LINR+ , we are able to employ a
clever trick shown in [10] that makes it sufficient for us
to work with MAX-LINZ+ and then carry the result over
to the reals as long as we can ensure that the co-efficients
in the MAX-LINZ+ instance we obtain are bounded and the
equations have sparse support.
Problem 4. MAX-LINZ+
Given: n variables x1, . . . , xn
m equations, each of which is of the type∑
i
aixi = b
where ai, b ∈ Z+ for all i = 1, . . . , n
Find: An assignment for x1, . . . , xn ∈ Z+ that satisfies the
maximum number of equations.
Theorem 5.2: Given an instance of MAX-LINZ+ , for all
positive constants , δ it is NP-hard to distinguish between
the following two cases:
• There exists a solution satisfying at least a (1 − )
fraction of the linear equations in the instance.
• Every solution satisfies at most a δ fraction of the linear
equations.
The above promise problem will be referred to as
MAX-LINZ+(1− , δ). Our proof follows the outline of the
proof for Theorem 3.4 in [10]. In the remainder of this
section, we go through the proof of Theorem 5.2, pointing
out the crucial points where our proof needs to differ from
[10]. We first define the LABEL-COVER problem below.
Definition 5.3: An instance of the LABEL-COVER(c, s)
problem comprises a bipartite graph H = (A,B, E), a set
of labels Σ and a set of projection mappings πe : Σ → Σ
for each edge e ∈ E . An assignment A : (A ∪ B) → Σ is a
mapping from the set of vertices onto the set of labels and
is legal for an edge e = (u, v) if πe(A(u)) = A(v). We
wish to ascertain for this instance of the problem if
• there exists an assignment A that is legal for at least a
c fraction of edges, or
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• every assignment is legal for at most an s fraction of
the edges.
The following theorem gives a hardness of approximation
result for LABEL-COVER and is due to [2] based on a result
of Raz’s. [16]
Theorem 5.4: ([2], [16]) There exists a constant γ > 0
such that for all sufficiently large constant-sized alphabets Σ,
it is NP-hard to distinguish between an instance of LABEL-
COVER that has an assignment legal for all edges and one for
which every assignment is legal for at most 1/|Σ|γ fraction
of edges.
As we noted in Section 1.3, there doesn’t seem to be
an easy reduction from MAX-LINZ (shown to be hard to
approximate in [10]) or from MAX-LINFp (shown to be hard
to approximate in [11]). Both those results are obtained by
reductions from LABEL-COVER and involve constructing
equations of the form x+y−z = c. Most of our effort in our
proof is spent on giving an alternative reduction that gives
rise to equations with coefficients in Z+. Specifically, our
proof abstracts properties of the verifier query distribution
that are sufficient for main steps of the [10] proof. We then
specify a different distribution than the one in [10] that
satisfies these properties, as well as an additional symmetry
property that is key to our final PCP system for MAX-LINZ+ .
5.1. Proof of Theorem 5.2
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Consider an instance of the LABEL-COVER(1, δ) problem
comprising the bipartite graph G(U, V,E) over n vertices
and m edges, a set of labels Σ = {1, . . . , h} and constraint
relations πe : Σ → Σ.
In our PCP system, the proof comprises the labels for all
vertices encoded using the Long Code we define below.
Definition 5.5: [10] For a label r ∈ [h], the codeword
C(r) is an evaluation of the projection function fr : Zh+ →
Z+ given by fr((z1, . . . , zh)) = zr over Zh+. In other words,
C(r)[x] = xr.
In other words, the proof is given to the verifier as a
sequence (C(A(v1)), . . . , C(A(vn))) where A is the pur-
ported legal assignment. The verifier makes queries to the
proof at three locations. These locations are chosen based
on probability distributions P1, P2, and Q over Zh+. In
the end, as in [10], we will discretize and truncate these
distributions so that the verifier uses O(log n) randomness,
so even though the proof is formally of infinite length, the
verifier only ever sees a (fixed) polynomially large fragment.
Our proof will use the following properties of probability
distributions over Zh+:
Definition 5.6: P is said to be (M, δ)-heavy if∑
x∈[M ]h
P (x) ≥ (1− δ).
Definition 5.7: P is said to be (δ, L)-decay-resilient if for
all x ∈ [L]h and any y ∈ Zh+
P (y + x)
P (y)
≥ δ.
Definition 5.7 encapsulates and highlights a crucial property
used in a technical step in the soundness analysis. We are
now ready to define P1, P2, which have the following form
(they are parameterized by p, c1, c2,Γ1,Γ2):
Definition 5.8: For j = 1, 2 we define the functions Pj
over Zh+ to be
Pj((x1, . . . , xh)) = Γj
h∏
i=1
e−cj|xi−p/2|.
The following proposition is easy to verify:
Proposition 5.9: There exists a positive integer M =
M(h, δ), p a prime greater than 3M , and positive reals
c1, c2,Γ1,Γ2 for which P1 and P2 with these parameter
settings are probability distributions, both (M, δ)-heavy, and
P2 is (1/4,M + t)-decay-resilient.
From now on we will fix M,p and the parameters defining
probability distributions P1, P2 as in this proposition.
Set t to be the least integer greater than h2/δ (it will
turn out that t 	 p). We let μ be a random variable
over Zh+ generated by picking each coordinate to be 0 with
probability (1 − ) and an integer chosen randomly from
[t] with probability . We denote Q to be the probability
distribution with which μ is chosen.
Now we can describe the verifier test. Let X1, X2 be
random variables over Zh distributed according to P1, P2,
respectively. We use x ◦ πe to denote the permutation of
πe applied to the co-ordinates of x ∈ Zh. In other words
(x ◦ πe)i = xπe(i). Using this notation, define random
variable X3 = p − (X1 ◦ πe + X2 + μ), where p denotes
(p, p, . . . , p). The equation that the verifier checks is:
C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[X3] = p. (2)
Lemma 5.10: The PCP system for MAX-LINZ+ de-
scribed above has (1 − ) completeness.
Proof: Suppose A is indeed a legal assignment for all
edges e ∈ E(G). This means that for any edge e = (u, v),
πe(A(v)) = A(u). Therefore, C(A(u))[X1]+C(A(v))[X2]+
C(A(v))[X3]
= X1A(u) + X2A(v) + pA(v) − (X1 ◦ πe + X2 + μ)A(v)
= X1A(u) + X2A(v) + p−X1πe(A(v)) −X2A(v) − μA(v)
= p− μA(v)
Recalling how we picked μ, we know that μA(v) is 0 with
probability exactly (1 − ) and hence, (2) is satisfied with
probability (1 − ).
Lemma 5.11: The PCP system for MAX-LINZ+ de-
scribed above has 19δ soundness error.
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Proof: Our soundness analysis follows [10], but we
need to carry out much of the Fourier manipulations anew
because we are analyzing a different verifier test (genuinely
so, because there doesn’t seem to be any easy transformation
to achieve positive coefficients by reduction from, say,
MAX-LINZ).
The key step to our proof is the following lemma which is
based on the first step of the proof used in [10] and abstracts
the necessary properties of P1, P2, Q in order to be applied
to our setting. We state the lemma below, and refer the reader
to the full version of the paper for a complete proof.
Lemma 5.12: Let P1, P2, Q be probability distributions
over Zh+ such that P1, P2, Q satisfy the following properties:
1) P1, P2 are (M, δ)-heavy.
2) P2 is (1/4,M + t)-decay-resilient.
3) P1, P2, Q are (p/3, δ)-heavy.
4) P2 is symmetric around (p/2, . . . , p/2); i.e., P2(x) =
P2(p− x)
Suppose that X1, X2, μ are chosen respectively from dis-
tributions P1, P2, Q and e = (u, v) is chosen uniformly at
random from the edge set E. Using X3 as shorthand for
p− (X1 ◦ πe + X2 + μ), suppose that
Pre,X1,X2,μ[C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2]+
C(A(v))[X3] = p] ≥ 19δ. (3)
Then letting Υ(u,v)p (X1, X2, μ) be the indicator variable for
the event
C(A(u))[X1] + C(A(v))[X2] + C(A(v))[X3] = 0 mod p,
and setting
G(x1, x2, μ) = P1(x1)
√
P2(x2) · P2(x3)Q(μ),
(again using x3 as shorthand for p− (x1 ◦πe +x2 +μ)) the
following holds:
E(u,v)
⎡
⎣ ∑
x1,x2,μ∈[ p3 ]h
G(x1, x2, μ)Υ(u,v)p (x1, x2, μ)
⎤
⎦ ≥ 8δ
We do not have room for the full proof, but we discuss the
key step and also why this lemma represents “progress” from
which the remainder of the soundness proof can proceed.
The proof of the lemma uses the decay-resilience of P2 via
the following proposition:
Proposition 5.13: Let P be a (1/4, (M + t))-decay-
resilient probability distribution over Zh+. Then for any
y ∈ [M + t]h and all x ∈ Zh+:
P (x) ≤ 2
√
P (x + y) · P (x).
We can write the left-hand-side of (3) as an expectation over
edges, of the expression∑
x1,x2,μ
P1(x1)P2(x2)Q(μ)Υ(u,v)(x1, x2, μ) (4)
where Υ(u,v) ≤ Υ(u,v)p is an indicator variable for the event
that the sum in the event associated with Υ(u,v)p is actually p,
rather than just a multiple of p. Using the above proposition,
together with the symmetry of P2, an upper bound on this
expression is
2 ·
∑
x1,x2,μ
P1(x1)
√
P2(x2)P2(x3)Q(μ)Υ(u,v)p (x1, x2, μ)
In the subsequent Fourier analysis, Υ(u,v)p is expressed as a
sum (over k) of products of the form
e
2πik
p C(A(u))[x1] · e 2πikp C(A(v))[x2] · e 2πikp C(A(v))[x3].
Making the substitution via the above proposition per-
mits regrouping and rewriting expression (4) above as the
sum of products of Q(μ) and the functions, Uk(x) =
P1(x)e
2πik
p C(A(u))[x] and Vk(x) =
√
P2(x)e
2πik
p C(A(v))[x]
.
This is only possibly because we “redistributed” the weight
P2(x2) as the product of two evaluations of the same
function P2 at the points x2 and x3, using P2’s decay
resilience and symmetry properties. Once it is in this form,
fairly standard manipulations (dating to [11]) and portions
of [10] constitute much of the rest of the analysis.
5.2. Tying it all together
Theorem 5.14: For all constants , δ > 0, the problem
MAX-LINR+(1− , δ) is NP-hard.
Proof: We just need the following argument from [10],
which we apply to Z+ and R+ as opposed to Z and R.
We give a reduction from MAX-LINZ+(1− , δ/8). Note
that our reduction in proving that this problem was hard
produced an instance of MAX-LINZ+ where each equation
consists of three variables:
xi + xj + xk = c
where xi, xj , xk, c ∈ Z+. The MAX-LINR+ instance we
construct will have exactly the same set of these equations:
x′i + x
′
j + x
′
k = c
with x′i, x′j , x′k chosen from R+. A solution in integers to the
original MAX-LINZ+ instance is automatically a solution to
the MAX-LINR+ instance.
Suppose that with probability at least δ over the choice
of equations in the instance, a solution is feasible. Then, for
any such equation:
x′i + x
′
j + x
′
k = c
by choosing each variable xs to be either x′s or x′s
uniformly at random for s = i, j, k we will have satisfied
the equation in the corresponding MAX-LINZ+ instance with
probability at least δ/8 thereby contradicting the hardness
assumption we made for the instance.
Theorem 5.15: For all constants , δ > 0, the problem
I-SAT∗(1− , 1/2 + 76δ) is NP-hard.
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Proof: The proof is by reduction from MAX-LINR+(1−
, 19δ) over a set of unknowns x1, . . . , xn. Our I-SAT∗
instance will have variables y1, . . . , yn; y′1, . . . , y′n. We de-
fine a partition S ∪ T where S = {yi|i = 1, . . . , n} and
T = {y′j |j = 1, . . . , n}. For each equation over the reals∑
i aixi = b in an instance of MAX-LINR+ , we construct
the I-SAT∗ clauses:⎛
⎝
∑
i∈S aiyi ≤ b
OR∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≤ b
⎞
⎠ ,
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈S aiyi ≥ b
AND∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≥ b
⎞
⎠ (5)
Let x1, . . . , xn be a solution for MAX-LINZ+ . We set yi =
y′i = xi for all i = 1, . . . , n. A solution satisfying at least a
(1−) fraction of the equations in the MAX-LINR+ instance
will satisfy at least a (1 − ) fraction of the inequality-
clauses in the I-SAT∗ instance. Conversely, suppose there
exists a solution satisfying at least a (1/2 + 76δ) fraction
of the inequality-clauses. Then there is at least a 38δ
fraction of inequality-clause pairs of type (5) which must
be satisfied. For each such pair, the type 2 clause implies
that both (
∑
i∈S aiyi ≥ b) and (
∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≥ b) and
the type 1 clause implies that one of
∑
i∈S aiyi ≤ b and∑
j∈T ajy
′
j ≥ b must hold. Therefore, for each such pair
one of
∑
i∈S aiyi = b or
∑
i∈T aiy
′
i = b must hold. Setting
xi to be yi for all i if there are more pairs for which∑
i∈S aiyi ≤ b and y′i otherwise, guarantees that at least
a 19δ fraction of equations
∑
i aixi = b must be satisfied
in the original MAX-LINZ+ instance thereby giving us the
necessary gap reduction. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
Theorems 5.14 and 5.15 give us the corollary below that
immediately yields the intended (1/2 + δ) hardness result:
Corollary 5.16: For all , δ > 0 the problem MAX-
STABLE-VALUES(1− , 1/2 + δ) is NP-hard.
Proof: We argue that the reduction from I-SAT∗ shown
in the proof of Theorem 4.2 is also a gap-preserving reduc-
tion and reduce from I-SAT∗(1 − , 1/2 + δ). Arguing first
for (1 − ) completeness, we note that if a clause in the
I-SAT∗ instance is satisfied then the corresponding pairwise
stability condition is also satisfied.
Suppose now, that (1/2 + δ) fraction of the stability
conditions for the active pairs are satisfied. But each such
condition exactly corresponds to a clause being satisfied in
the original I-SAT∗ instance thereby giving us the required
(1/2 + δ) soundness for STABLE-VALUES.
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